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ARTICLES

Policing School Discipline
Catherine Y. Kim†
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the frequent admonishment that
“students [do not] shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate,”1 courts routinely defer to school officials in
cases involving the investigation and punishment of youth in
schools.2 Consequently, youth accused of school misconduct are
not entitled to the same procedural protections to which they
would be entitled outside the school context3: school officials may
search their belongings or persons without a warrant or probable
cause,4 and officials may question them without first providing
Miranda warnings.5 Courts and scholars alike defend such
†
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Clark, John Coyle, Charles Daye, Dana Thompson Dorsey, Maxine Eichner, Michael
Gerhardt, Myriam Gilles, Don Hornstein, Joe Kennedy, Bill Marshall, Eric Muller,
Richard Myers, Teri Ravenell, Mark Weidemaier, Kimberly West-Faulcon, and the
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1
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995)
(holding that the scope of constitutional rights for public school students is limited by
“what is appropriate for children in school”).
3
See generally William G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School
Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 640-41 (1971)
(comparing procedural rights of student accused of misconduct with those of an adult
suspected of a crime); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the
Law-Abiding Public, 1989 S. CT. REV. 87, 115 (same).
4
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (sustaining student search
where school officials have a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence
of criminal activity or a violation of school rules).
5
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this issue, lower
courts consistently find no custodial interrogation where a youth is questioned by a
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restrictions on students’ constitutional rights on the ground that
school discipline, unlike law enforcement, serves the educational
interests of youth.6 Under this view, the educational value of
discipline and consequent alignment of interests between official
and student render the constitutional protections guaranteed
outside of the school context inapposite in schools.7
Recent observations of a “school-to-prison pipeline”
resulting in the increased criminalization of student
misbehavior, however, cast doubt on this characterization of
school discipline.8 Today, police officers routinely patrol public
school hallways on a full-time basis as “school resource officers”;
and school officials refer a growing number of youth to the
juvenile and criminal justice systems for school-based
misconduct.9 These developments call for a critical reassessment
school official. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992);
State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580, 583 (N.H. 1998); In re Harold S., 731 A.2d 265, 268
(R.I. 1999); see also Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the
Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 59 n.90 (2006) (discussing
cases); cf. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding that determination
of whether youth interrogated at school by police officer is in custody for Miranda
purposes requires consideration of youth’s age).
6
See infra Part I.A; see also Buss, supra note 3, at 570 (describing judicial
deference to the “mystique of the educational institution”); Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should
Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 49, 64 (1996) (conceptualizing debate over restrictions on students’
constitutional rights as a debate over competing educational goals); James A. Ryan, The
Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1340-41 (2000) (analyzing limits
to students’ constitutional rights as measured against academic function of schools).
7
See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 118 (analyzing restriction of probable
cause requirement for student searches as based on the view that Fourth Amendment
protections “reflect[] a balance appropriate mainly to cases in which private activity
and public controls are posed in conflict,” which is not the case when students are
searched for wrongdoing); see also Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking,
and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 294-96 (arguing that
alignment of individual and collective government interests renders criminal
procedural protections, such as warrant requirement, unnecessary). But see Laurence
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 312 n.28 (1975)
(critiquing assumption that interests of school official and punished student are
aligned rather than in conflict for purposes of school discipline).
8
See CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE:
STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM (2010); MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF
AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 28 (2010) (utilizing term “school-to-prison pipeline”
to refer to the way in which “school systems, police, and juvenile justice programs
combine in a process that removes students from mainstream schools and puts them in
separate programs that often involve lockup, searches, and little educational value”); Lisa
H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets
Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 981 (2010) (noting that “the term
school-to-prison pipeline” has become “part of our national lexicon,” used to describe “the
growing trend of school officials to refer students to law enforcement for acts committed
while in school, and the increasing deployment of police in schools”).
9
Infra Part II.B; see also, e.g., Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing
School Police Officers: A Conceptual and Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST.
591, 599 (2006) (discussing emerging prevalence of police officers in schools); Philip J.
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of the extent to which contemporary school discipline practices
advance the educational goals that historically justified their
insulation from judicial scrutiny.10
This article evaluates empirical evidence on
contemporary discipline practices and finds that, in a growing
number of jurisdictions that rely on law enforcement to
maintain order in schools, it can no longer be said that the
investigation and punishment of school misconduct serves the
accused student’s educational interests, or even the interests of
the larger student body.
These changes in the operation of school discipline
parallel the changes to the juvenile justice system addressed in
the landmark case of In re Gault.11 Traditionally, youth in
juvenile court were not entitled to the procedural protections
guaranteed to adults in criminal court, on the ground that
juvenile courts, unlike criminal courts, were assumed to be
nonadversarial institutions designed to further the best
interests of the youth; young people would receive the
benevolent protection of court officials in exchange for giving
up their procedural rights.12 Accumulating evidence of juvenile
courts’ failure to achieve those beneficent goals, however, led
the U.S. Supreme Court in Gault to reconsider prior doctrine
and extend to youth at least some of the procedural rights
Cook, Denise C. Gottfredson & Chongmin Na, School Crime Control and Prevention, 39
CRIME & JUST. 313 (2010) (observing “greater recourse to arrest and the juvenile courts
rather than school-based discipline”); Paul Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The
Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79
(2008) (analyzing criminalization of student misconduct); Michael P. Krezmien et al.,
Juvenile Court Referrals and the Public Schools: Nature and Extent of the Practice in
Five States, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 273 (2010) (examining data on rising incidence
of school-based arrest); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the
Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 280 (2009) (analyzing role of
police officers in schools).
10
See Holland, supra note 5 (arguing for consideration of increased policing
in schools in determining Miranda rights for youth questioned at school); Josh Kagan,
Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement
Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 304, 321 (2004) (contending that probable cause
should be required for student searches in schools where police officers are
permanently staffed at school, security cameras are prevalent, and school officials are
required to report criminal incidents to police); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to
the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches
Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (2003) (arguing
that student searches should require probable cause if search could result in criminal
liability); Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in
Public Schools: Student Citizens in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25 (exploring
doctrinal issues arising from police involvement in public schools).
11
387 U.S. 1 (1967). This parallel between juvenile justice and school discipline
was presciently drawn as early as 1971 by William G. Buss. Buss, supra note 3.
12
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-17.
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formerly limited to adults in criminal court.13 Courts today
likewise should evaluate evidence of school discipline’s
achievement of its beneficent goals, and modify accordingly the
procedural protections available to youth in public schools.
Part I explores the development of the educational
theory of school discipline in legal doctrine, focusing on the role
that social science has played to restrict the procedural rights
of students. The Supreme Court has reasoned that school
discipline—in stark contrast to law enforcement—serves the
educational interests of the student who is investigated and
punished; for this reason, constitutional rights that would be
available to youth outside of school are not available to them in
the context of school discipline. In the early foundational cases
establishing these restrictions, members of the Court relied on
personal intuitions about school discipline, even when those
intuitions conflicted with empirical evidence properly
presented before them. More recent cases, however, suggest an
increased willingness to scrutinize the impact of school
discipline practices in determining whether the deference
traditionally afforded to school officials remains warranted.
Part II analyzes empirical findings on contemporary
school discipline practices and their pedagogical impact,
focusing on school-based arrests and other forms of referral to
law enforcement. Analyzing a number of recent empirical
studies, this part finds that schools increasingly rely on law
enforcement to maintain order, although the extent to which
they do varies. It then explores scholarship from related
disciplines in education, sociology, and criminology to conclude
that the use of law enforcement in schools has a negative
impact on educational outcomes, not only for the investigated
youth, but also for the larger student body. These findings
suggest that the investigation and punishment of students in
at least some jurisdictions no longer serves the pedagogical
interests that traditionally justified exempting students from
procedural protections.
Part III sets forth a framework for courts and
nonjudicial actors to take such social science evidence into
account. It proposes that courts engage in a factual assessment
of school discipline practices to determine whether the
traditional rationale for denying youth in schools constitutional

13

Id. at 18-24.
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procedural rights remains warranted.14 Given the significant
variance across jurisdictions in school discipline practices, the
analysis employed should be location-specific. The presumption
that school discipline serves pedagogical goals would be
preserved, but could be rebutted with evidence showing that
disciplinary practices in the particular school or district at
issue do not further the educational interests of accused
youths. Where a court finds that school discipline operates
primarily to further law enforcement goals rather than
pedagogical goals, investigations of student misconduct should
be presumed to be adversarial and thus subject to the full scope
of constitutional protections that would be available to youth
outside the school context. By contrast, where school discipline
practices are found to adhere to the traditional model of
discipline in furtherance of pedagogical goals, doctrinal
restrictions on students’ constitutional rights would remain in
place. Part III then considers the role of nonjudicial actors,
arguing that those who make the substantive determination as
to whether certain forms of conduct should be criminalized in
the first instance will play a critical part in any reform effort.
I.

DOCTRINAL RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENTS’ PROCEDURAL
RIGHTS

Courts routinely defer to school officials in cases
involving the investigation and punishment of students.15 A
schoolchild accused of bringing a water pistol to school or
tearing a page out of a book does not enjoy the same
constitutional rights as an adult or child suspected of a
criminal act on the street.16 School officials may search the
14

See Tamar Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for
Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1495-98 (2009) (urging judges and lawmakers to
review empirical data on impact of school discipline practices). See generally DAVID L.
FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 97
(2008) (arguing courts should revisit precedent that is based on outmoded empirical
beliefs); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 69, 91 (2008) (prescribing litigation process for social fact finding within
courts); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1049 (2006) (critiquing judicial failure to consider impact of changed
circumstances on doctrine).
15
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995)
(holding that scope of constitutional rights for public school students is limited by
“what is appropriate for children in school”).
16
See Buss, supra note 3, at 640-41 (discussing constitutional rights of a
student accused of tearing a page out of a book); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 115
(comparing the rights of a “student with a water pistol” with those of an adult
suspected of a crime).
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youth’s backpack without a warrant or probable cause17 and
question the youth without first providing Miranda warnings.18
Moreover, courts impose these restrictions on rights regardless
of the relative seriousness of the offense or even the prospect of
criminal prosecution.19 Indeed, some courts have denied these
criminal procedural guarantees to youth in schools even where
a uniformed police officer participated in the investigation.20
While there has always been substantial disagreement
within the scholarly literature over the extent to which
constitutional rights should be restricted in the public school
context, both sides of the debate share a common starting point:
such restrictions must be justified, if at all, by pedagogical
goals.21 For example, James E. Ryan has argued that courts
grant special deference to school officials when—and only
17

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19
See Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting
requirement for probable cause where student was suspected of bringing firearm to
school); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting
Miranda warnings for questioning by school official where principal intended to turn
over incriminating evidence of the student’s drug dealing to police); State v. Tinkham,
719 A.2d 580, 583 (N.H. 1998) (holding that school officials need not provide Miranda
warnings prior to questioning student suspected of dealing drugs); In re Harold S., 731
A.2d 265, 268 (R.I. 1999) (concluding school principal who conferred with police was not
required to provide Miranda warnings prior to questioning the student).
20
The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of the standard for
student searches conducted “in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985). Absent such guidance,
lower courts have split. Compare People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996)
(holding search conducted by school resource officer subject to reasonable suspicion
standard rather than ordinary probable cause requirements), and In re Josue T., 989
P.2d 431 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (same), and R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tenn.
2008) (same), and In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1997) (rejecting probable
cause requirement for search by police officer at the request of and in conjunction with
school officials), with A.J.M. v. State, 617 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(applying probable cause standard to search by school resource officer), and Patman v.
State, 537 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (applying probable cause to search by police
officer on special detail to the school).
With respect to students’ right to Miranda warnings prior to school
interrogation, compare State v. Schloegel, 769 N.W.2d 130, 133-34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding no custodial interrogation during questioning of student at school by police
because if the student was “in custody at all, [he] was in the custody of the school and was
not being detained by the police at the time”), with In re T.A.G., 663 S.E.2d 392, 396 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that involvement of school resource officer transforms
interrogation by school principal into custodial interrogation requiring Miranda
warnings). But see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (rejecting argument
that interrogation of youth at school by police never qualifies as custodial interrogation).
For scholarly discussion of the procedural rights applicable to school-based
investigations involving police officers, see Holland, supra note 5, at 45-58; Kagan,
supra note 10, at 316-20; Pinard, supra note 10, at 1080-90; Peter Price, When Is a
Police Officer an Officer of the Law?: The Status of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541, 560-67 (2009).
21
See supra note 6.
18
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when—they are acting in their privileged role as educators and
transmitters of knowledge.22 Similarly, Ann Proffitt Dupre has
characterized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in school
discipline cases as reflective of a larger debate about competing
educational goals.23
Central to this defense of restrictions on students’ rights
is the assumed alignment of interests between students and
school officials.24 Procedural protections guaranteed in the
criminal context have been deemed unnecessary in the school
context to the extent that the investigation and punishment of
student misconduct—in stark contrast to the investigation and
punishment of ordinary crime—is for the youth’s own
educational benefit, teaching the importance of respect for
others and acceptance of responsibility. Therefore, the standard
calculus applicable outside the school discipline context—
balancing the tradeoff between the individual interest and the
competing collective or state interest—has been deemed
inapplicable in schools. Analyzing restrictions on students’
privacy rights during school searches, Stephen Schulhofer has
reasoned that “[b]oth the investigating authority and the person
searched are participants in a shared mission,” rendering
inapposite ordinary constitutional protections that “reflect[] a
balance appropriate mainly to cases in which the private activity
and public controls are poised in conflict.”25 Under this view, the
convergence of interests between school official and student,
unlike the adversarial interests of the adult criminal suspect
and law enforcement, obviates the need for the robust
protections guaranteed in the law enforcement context.
This part traces the development of this pedagogical
theory in the three foundational cases in school discipline—
Goss v. Lopez, involving school suspension; Ingraham v.
Wright, involving corporal punishment; and New Jersey v.
T.L.O., involving student searches. Each of these cases relied
on the view that school discipline educationally benefits the
punished youth to justify restrictions on students’ rights.
Interestingly, although the Court frequently relies on social
science evidence in determining educational rights in other
contexts, most famously in footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of
22

Ryan, supra note 6, at 1341. He continues, “the further a policy moves away
from the core academic function of schools, the more likely the Court will apply
traditional constitutional rules to judge the policy and strike it down.” Id.
23
Dupre, supra note 6, at 64.
24
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
25
Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 117-18.
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Education,26 these foundational school discipline cases are
notable for the conspicuous absence of social science support for
their conclusions. Rather, in these cases, members of the Court
relied almost exclusively on personal intuitions regarding the
operation of school discipline, even when those intuitions
conflicted with empirical evidence properly before the Court.
However, more recent cases demonstrate an increased
willingness to factually assess the operation of school discipline
to determine whether the judicial deference traditionally
afforded to school officials remains warranted.
A.

The Foundational Cases

Judicial reliance on the perceived educational value of
school discipline to impose limits on students’ procedural rights
dates at least to Goss v. Lopez,27 decided in 1975, the first time
the Supreme Court addressed the scope of these rights. During
race-related tensions at a high school, lead plaintiff Dwight
Lopez was in the school lunchroom when a group of black
students entered and began overturning tables.28 Lopez claimed
he immediately left the lunchroom and did not participate in
any of the disruptive activities.29 After he was suspended for
this incident, he filed a class action lawsuit arguing that the
refusal to provide students with any opportunity to assert
innocence and challenge a school suspension violated
procedural due process rights.30
On certiorari, a majority of the Court held that school
discipline proceedings are subject only to minimal due process
protections. Suspensions of up to ten days require only an
“informal give-and-take” between the principal and the
student, which need not occur prior to the suspension.31
Acknowledging that these limitations provide individuals
facing a denial of education with fewer procedural protections
than those afforded to individuals facing a denial of, for
example, welfare benefits or a driver’s license, the Court
emphasized that unlike other forms of state sanctions, school
26

347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954); see Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of
Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005)
(discussing influence of footnote eleven in use of empiricism in education cases).
27
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
28
Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1284-85 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff’d sub
nom. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
29
Id. at 1285.
30
Id. at 1281.
31
Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
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discipline serves a pedagogical purpose designed for the benefit
of the child: “Suspension is considered not only to be a
necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational
device.”32 The Court expressed concern that imposing additional
due process requirements on school discipline would “destroy
its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.”33
Justice Powell’s dissent would have gone further,
reasoning that the educational value of school discipline justifies
the denial of any procedural due process protections.34 His
position expressly emphasized what the majority had only
implied: both the punished student and the disciplining school
official have a shared interest in swift and informal punishment,
rendering traditional due process protections inappropriate.
Justice Powell stated, “When an immature student merits
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if appropriate
sanctions are not applied or if procedures for their application are
so formalized as to invite a challenge to the teacher’s authority.”35
Accusing the majority of “misapprehending the reality of the
normal teacher-pupil relationship,” the dissent insisted that
“[u]nlike the divergent and even sharp conflict of interests
usually present where due process rights are asserted, the
interests here implicated⎯of the State through its schools and of
the pupils⎯are essentially congruent.”36
Importantly, neither opinion cited any social science
support for its assumptions about the benefits of school
discipline—nor could it. The record before the Court—far from
validating the educational value of school suspensions—was
replete with facts indicating that school suspensions harm
students. Students testified at trial to the negative impact that
the suspension and subsequent loss of instruction time had on
their academic progress, and two prominent psychologists gave
expert testimony regarding the adverse consequences of
suspensions.37 Based on this evidence, the district court entered
factual findings that school suspensions are harmful to
students and may compromise academic achievement.38 On
32

Id. at 580.
Id. at 583.
34
Id. at 585-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
35
Id. at 593.
36
Id. at 591, 594.
37
Appellees’ Brief on the Merits at 12-13, 33-34, Goss, 419 U.S 565 (No. 73898), 1974 WL 185915 (citing testimony from trial record).
38
Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1292 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (finding, as a
matter of fact, that “[m]ost students respond [to suspensions] in one or more of the
following ways: (1) The suspension is a blow to the student’s self-esteem. (2) The
33
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appeal, the student-appellees cited numerous scholarly articles
further demonstrating the educational harms associated with
suspensions, and amicus briefs filed by the NAACP, the
Children’s Defense Fund, and the ACLU likewise cited studies
describing the negative repercussions of school suspensions on
children, including reputational harm to the student, loss of
instructional time, exacerbation of deviant behavior, lower high
school graduation rates, and fewer future employment
opportunities.39 Yet the majority ignored these facts altogether.
Justice Powell’s dissent acknowledged them, but dismissed
them with little discussion as “generalized opinion evidence.”40
With no mention of the clearly erroneous standard applicable
to the trial court’s findings of fact,41 Justice Powell summarily
reached the contrary factual conclusion, that “[f]or average,
normal children—the vast majority—suspension for a few days
is simply not a detriment; it is a commonplace occurrence . . . it
leaves no scars; affects no reputations; indeed, it often may be
viewed by the young as a badge of some distinction and a
welcome holiday.”42 In this way, restrictions on procedural due
process rights in public schools rested on the unsupported
factual contention that school discipline furthers the
educational interests of the suspended student.
Two years later in Ingraham v. Wright43 the Court again
invoked the perceived educational value of school discipline,
this time to reject a constitutional challenge to abuse in the
administration of corporal punishment. In Ingraham, a student
who was slow to respond to a teacher’s instructions was hit
student feels powerless and helpless. (3) The student views school authorities and
teachers with resentment, suspicion and fear. (4) The student learns withdrawal as a
mode of problem solving. (5) The student has little perception of the reasons for the
suspension. He does not know what offending acts he committed. (6) The student is
stigmatized by his teachers and school administrators as deviant. They expect the
student to be a troublemaker in the future. A student’s suspension may also result in
his family and neighbors branding him as a troublemaker. Ultimately repeated
suspension may result in academic failure.”), aff’d sub nom. Goss, 419 U.S. 565.
39
Appellees’ Brief on the Merits at 34-36, Goss, 419 U.S 565 (No. 73-898);
Brief for the Children’s Defense Fund of the Washington Research Project et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 65-68, Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (No. 73-898), 1974 WL
185919; Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 14-15, Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (No. 73-898), 1974
WL 185916; Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees at 6, Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (No. 73-898), 1974 WL 185918.
40
Goss, 419 U.S. at 597-98 & n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41
9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2583 (3d ed. 2010).
42
Goss, 419 U.S. at 598 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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twenty times with a paddle, resulting in a hematoma requiring
medical attention, while another student lost use of his arm for
a week because of a teacher’s paddling.44 Rejecting the students’
Eighth Amendment and due process claims, the Court
reasoned that “since before the American Revolution,” corporal
punishment has been viewed as necessary for the “moderate
correction” of a child’s misbehavior and “for the proper
education of the child.”45 The Court acknowledged that its
holding meant that youth in schools enjoyed fewer protections
than convicted criminals, as criminals subjected to corporal
punishment would clearly be entitled to raise a constitutional
challenge to that punishment.46 Nonetheless, the Court imposed
a categorical distinction between punishment in the law
enforcement context and punishment in the school discipline
context, concluding that the “prisoner and the schoolchild stand
in wholly different circumstances”47 with respect to the
constitutional rights to which they are entitled.
As in Goss, the Ingraham Court made little effort to
garner factual support for its assumptions about corporal
punishment. At the trial level, plaintiff-schoolchildren
submitted evidence of repeated physical abuse in the
administration of corporal punishment, which would destroy
whatever educational value might otherwise inhere in its use.
The district court did not enter any factual findings about the
credibility of testimony regarding these allegations, but
concluded that—even if the testimony were credible—no relief
would be granted.48 The Supreme Court, rather than engaging
with the evidence of abuse, simply assumed this abuse was
infrequent, thereby obviating the need for the requested
procedural protections. Instead of invoking factual support, the
majority relied on its “common-sense judgment that excessive
corporal punishment is exceedingly rare in the public schools.”49
Criticizing the lack of evidentiary support for the majority’s
claims, the dissenting four Justices accused the majority of
relying on “mere armchair speculation” to justify denials of
constitutional rights to schoolchildren.50

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 657.
Id. at 661-62, 664.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 664-71.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 677 n.45.
Id. at 690 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
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Finally, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court relied on the
purported educational value of school discipline and
consequent alignment of interests between student and school
official to limit the scope of Fourth Amendment protections
available in public schools.51 In T.L.O., a school principal
searched the purse of a student accused of smoking cigarettes;
smoking was a violation of school rules but not of any criminal
law. During the course of the search, the principal found items
implicating the student in drug dealing, which he turned over
to the police to be used against the student in subsequent
delinquency proceedings.52
Holding that school officials may search a student’s
person or belongings absent the warrant or probable cause that
would be required outside of the school context, the Court
reasoned that to hold otherwise would compromise “the value of
preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.”53
Justice Powell’s concurrence repeated his insistence from Goss
that the alignment of interests presented in school discipline
cases “make[s] it unnecessary to afford students the same
constitutional protections granted adults and youths in a
nonschool setting.”54 This alignment, he reasoned, sharply
distinguished the teacher-student relationship from that of
citizens and law enforcement officers:
Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal
suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate
criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and
to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial.
Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between school
authorities and pupils.55

Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s concurrence reasoned that the
educational role of teachers excused them from ordinary
Fourth Amendment standards: “A teacher’s focus is, and
should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on
developing evidence against a particular troublemaker.”56
Again, the Court in T.L.O. appeared to rely on commonsense intuitions about what is good for the child, rather than
engaging in a fact-based inquiry. Indeed, the contention
51
52
53
54
55
56

469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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regarding an alignment of interests between student and
school official, purported to distinguish the relationship from
that between police officer and suspect, was undercut by the
facts of T.L.O. itself: the school official ultimately referred the
student to law enforcement and the juvenile court.57 Yet, rather
than performing any empirical inquiry into the frequency with
which the interests of accused students conflict with those of
school officials, the Court deemed that rate to be sufficiently
“rare” to justify restricting students’ rights. Underscoring the
absence of evidentiary support for the majority’s claims, Justice
Brennan’s dissenting opinion characterized the majority’s
rationales as “brief nods by the Court in the direction of a
neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an
unanalyzed exercise of judicial will” designed to “reach[] a
predetermined conclusion acceptable to this Court’s impressions
of what authority teachers need.”58
In these foundational cases, then, the Court has relied
on the assumed educational value of school discipline and the
purported convergence of interests between school official and
student to conclude that ordinary procedural protections are
inapplicable in schools.
It is true, however, that these cases did not rely
exclusively on these premises to justify limits on students’
procedural rights. Rather, the Court has suggested an
additional justification for such restrictions—the weighty
interests of other students in maintaining an environment
conducive to learning.59 Goss emphasized that the maintenance
of order and discipline is “essential if the educational function
is to be performed,”60 and T.L.O. underscored the heavy weight

57

Id. at 372 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(challenging the assumption that law enforcement and school discipline categorically
differ by pointing out that T.L.O. herself was subject to prosecution as a delinquent as
a result of the search); see also Tribe, supra note 7, at 312 (“[E]ven if one concedes that
there is no inherent clash in the interest of teacher and student, does it not remain
possible for them to clash in fact . . . ?”).
58
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 367, 369 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
59
See Ryan, supra note 6, at 1341, 1411-14 (interpreting limits to
constitutional rights in school discipline cases as resting on the view that they are
necessary to “preserve an atmosphere that is safe and conducive to learning” and “to
maintain discipline in order to transmit academic knowledge”); see also Tribe, supra
note 7, at 312 (“[E]ven if in general the teachers’ and child’s interest truly converge, at
the moment of suspension convergence must surely turn into clash: the teacher is
saying that the best interests of other students will be served by this particular
student’s suspension.”).
60
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
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of the “[s]chool’s interest in maintaining an environment where
learning can take place.”61
As a purely doctrinal matter, however, this alternative
justification proves less than satisfactory. While few would
contest that the state interest in providing a functional
educational environment is significant, the Court has not
attempted to explain why this interest would outweigh the
individual student’s interest if those interests are in fact in
conflict. Outside the school context, the state interest in
preventing violent street crimes is of course significant, yet it
does not outweigh the individual interest in receiving full
procedural protections. It is not at all clear why this calculus
balancing competing interests between state and individual
should not apply in the school context as well. Perhaps
recognizing this deficiency, the Court has relied on this
alternative argument only to buttress its more primary
assumptions regarding the perceived educational value to the
investigated or punished student and the purported absence of
adversarial interests in the context of school discipline.
B.

Recent Cases and the Consideration of Evidentiary
Support

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s earlier reluctance
to engage with empirical evidence in this area, more recent cases
suggest an increased willingness to assess the actual operation
of school discipline in particular jurisdictions to determine
whether the traditional deference remains warranted. In these
opinions, the Court has begun to consider the purpose and
impact of the investigation and punishment of students.62
Moreover, where evidence suggested that a particular
disciplinary practice negatively impacts the education of
students, the Court has concluded that judicial interference is
warranted.
Vernonia School District v. Acton63 and Board of
Education v. Earls64 examined suspicionless drug testing in
61

469 U.S. at 326. More recently, in sustaining the suspicionless drug testing
of student-athletes, the Court in Vernonia School District v. Acton emphasized that
schools routinely require students to submit to invasions of their privacy not only “for
their own good,” but also for “that of their classmates.” 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1994).
62
See generally Rachel R. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on
Race, Social Science, and the Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (2010) (discussing
historical changes in the Supreme Court’s willingness to consider empirical evidence to
support factual suppositions).
63
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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public schools. In Acton, the Court sustained such tests for
student athletes, but only after conducting a factual
assessment of how the search policy operated in the particular
school at issue and the actual impact of the policy on students.
Rather than simply assume, as it had done in prior cases, that
the investigation of students for drug use benefited students,
the Court analyzed empirical evidence of the dangers of drug
use to students, and then sustained the policy only after it
satisfied itself that the particular drug tests at issue were
“undertaken for prophylactic and distinctly non-punitive
purposes,” as school policy dictated that the results of any
positive tests would not be turned over to law enforcement
authorities.65 Thus, the Court engaged in a factual, schoolspecific inquiry before concluding that the interests of the
student and school officials were aligned, rendering
unnecessary the individualized suspicion that would be
required outside of the school context.66 Similarly, in Earls, the
Court sustained suspicionless drug testing of students
participating in extracurricular activities only after engaging
in a factual inquiry regarding the operation of the drug testing
policy in the particular school and concluding that the drug
tests benefited rather than harmed the tested student in large
part because under school policy the results were not turned
over to law enforcement or used to punish the student.67
Even more explicitly, in Safford v. Redding, the Court
engaged in a factual inquiry to test the long-held categorical
assumption that the investigation and punishment of student
wrongdoing benefits the student.68 In Redding, school officials
strip searched a thirteen-year-old student accused of bringing
prescription-strength ibuprofen to school. Although the Court
affirmed T.L.O.’s holding that the school setting requires only a
reasonable suspicion to justify a student search, it nonetheless
considered the actual impact of the search on the student and
concluded that the student’s Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated. Rather than assuming, as it had in T.L.O., that
school searches categorically advance the educational interests
64

536 U.S. 822 (2002).
515 U.S. at 658 & n.2.
66
By focusing on the operation of a school discipline practice in a particular
school, the Court appeared to treat the impact of school discipline on youth as an
adjudicative fact rather than a legislative one. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
67
536 U.S. at 833.
68
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
65
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of the searched student, the Court cited the amicus brief for the
National Association of Social Workers and an article from the
Journal of School Psychology to emphasize the negative
psychological impact of a strip search on youth.69 Redding thus
suggests an increased willingness by the Court to evaluate—
rather than simply assume—the impact of investigations and
punishments on students in determining whether the rights of
those students warrant restriction.
II.

EMERGING MODES OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

As set forth in the previous part, doctrinal restrictions
on the rights of youth accused of school-based misconduct rest
on a series of factual assumptions about the manner in which
school discipline operates and the educational value of this
discipline. Specifically, the Supreme Court has limited these
rights in public schools on the ground that the investigation
and punishment of students is intended for the students’
educational benefit. Thus, it has reasoned, the adversarial
relationship characteristic of law enforcement encounters
outside of the school context simply does not apply to
investigations of student misconduct to necessitate the same
level of procedural protections. Recently, the Court has
appeared willing to assess the facts underlying these
assumptions. Based on this development, this part evaluates
empirical evidence of contemporary school discipline practices
and their educational impact on students.70
As others have observed, the past two decades witnessed
a dramatic shift in public discourse, with an increasing focus on
school safety and crime prevention.71 This part evaluates how
that shift has manifested in the operation of school discipline. It
first provides an overview of policy developments that led to a
convergence of school discipline and law enforcement. Next, it
reviews a series of recently published studies measuring the
extent to which school officials rely on law enforcement to
maintain order. Finally, it analyzes social science research
69

Id. at 2641-42 (citations omitted).
See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 997, 1007 (2006) (discussing value of empirical research to measure legal
doctrines’ progress toward expressed normative goals).
71
See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR 207-31 (2007).
70
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examining the likely impact of law enforcement referrals on
educational outcomes. Based on these findings, this part
concludes that, at least in some jurisdictions, school discipline no
longer serves the educational interests that traditionally
justified insulating it from ordinary constitutional requirements.
A.

The Shift Toward School Crime Control

Following a series of school shootings in the 1990s, a
widespread sense of panic descended on public schools across the
nation. A year after the shooting at Columbine High School in
1999, almost two-thirds of Americans reported feeling it was
somewhat likely or very likely that a school-shooting spree would
occur in their community.72 As one scholar put it, “policy makers
reacted abruptly to what they perceived to be a huge swing in
public opinion: a moral panic swept the country as parents and
children suddenly feared for their safety at school.”73 Importantly,
this fear extended to predominantly white suburban and rural
areas; school violence was no longer contained in the
predominantly minority, low-income, inner-city neighborhoods
traditionally associated with crime. Republican Senator Ben
Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, for example, stated,
These recent school shootings have occurred in suburbs, small towns,
and major metropolitan areas all across our nation. They have
shattered the myth that school violence is a problem solely confined
to the inner cities. Events now clearly show that the potential for
serious and deadly school violence is everywhere.74

Indeed, a poll conducted in 1999 found that suburban and rural
parents were more likely than minority parents to feel a school
shooting was somewhat likely or very likely to occur in their
communities.75
This fear resulted in the deployment of large numbers of
police officers to patrol public school hallways. Today, nearly

72

Mark Gillespie, One in Three Say It Is Very Likely that Columbine-Type
Shootings Could Happen in Their Community, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2000),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/2980/One-Three-Say-Very-Likely-ColumbineType-ShootingsCould.aspx.
73
ELIZABETH DONOHUE ET AL., SCHOOL HOUSE HYPE: SCHOOL SHOOTINGS
AND THE REAL RISKS KIDS FACE IN AMERICA 3 (1998).
74
144 CONG. REC. 14, 187 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ben Campbell).
75
Mark Gillespie, School Violence Still a Worry for American Parents,
GALLUP (Sept. 7, 1999), http://www.gallup.com/poll/3613/School-Violence-Still-WorryAmerican-Parents.aspx.
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half of all public schools have assigned police officers,76 and 60
percent of high school teachers report armed police officers
stationed on school grounds.77 Often with the help of federal
funding, school-based police officers, frequently referred to as
“school resource officers,” are the fastest-growing segment of
law enforcement.78 These officers’ roles vary significantly across
schools, with some charged primarily with enforcement of
criminal laws, while others are focused on mentoring,
counseling, and teaching duties.79
The reliance on law enforcement to maintain school
order is not limited to jurisdictions with school resource
officers. Jurisdictions lacking the resources to hire full-time
police personnel nonetheless may regularly summon the local
police department through calls for service. Indeed, rapidly
spreading “zero-tolerance” policies mandate that school officials
call the police any time certain predetermined infractions are
committed. In Rhode Island, a statewide policy requires school
principals to report all school fights to the police for criminal
prosecution.80 Alabama requires all principals to notify law
enforcement any time a person violates district policies
regarding physical harm or threats of harm.81
Similar mandates have been adopted at the local district
level as well. The Atlanta Public School System, for example,
maintains a zero-tolerance policy requiring school officials to
immediately report to the police any student involved in drugrelated offenses or gang activity.82 Chicago Public Schools began
requiring school officials to notify police of all burglary,
aggravated assault, and gang activity offenses, while providing
administrators with discretion to refer students to the police for

76

BARBARA RAYMOND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. POLICING
SERVS., ASSIGNING POLICE OFFICERS TO SCHOOLS (2010).
77
Hirschfield, supra note 9, at 82.
78
David Snyder, A New Generation of School Safety Patrol: Officers Boost
Security, Community Connection, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003, at T8 (quoting executive
director of the National Association of School Resource Officers).
79
PETER FINN & JACK MCDEVITT, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS 43 (2005).
80
140 CONG. REC. 10281 (1994).
81
ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (2010); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341
(West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-113 (2007); 14 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14 § 4112
(2007); FL. STAT. ANN. § 1006.13 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184 (2009); 105
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-21.7 (LexisNexis 2007).
82
ATLANTA PUB. SCH., 2010-2011 STUDENT HANDBOOK 22-23 (2010),
available at http://www.atlanta.k12.ga.us/cms/lib/GA01000924/Centricity/Domain/94/
StudentHandbook.pdf.
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lesser offenses such as gambling, forgery, or petty theft.83 The
Houston Independent School District requires school principals
to notify the police any time there are reasonable grounds to
believe that a student has engaged in any criminal offense at
school.84 The East Carroll Parish School System in Louisiana, a
small, rural district, requires that law enforcement remove and
file charges against any student age twelve or over who is an
aggressor in a fight.85 Guilford County Schools system in North
Carolina requires that school officials call the police every time
an aggravated assault, sexual offense, weapons offense, or drug
possession is suspected.86 Nelson County Public Schools system
in Virginia requires schools to refer to the police all instances of
drug offenses, violence, interference with school authorities, and
driving without a license on campus.87
As the scope of these zero-tolerance policies suggests,
the infractions for which students are referred to law
enforcement have expanded considerably. Numerous states
criminalize the offense of disrupting school activities88 or

83

CHI. PUB. SCH., STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
2010-2011 SCHOOL YEAR 8, 13-16 (2010), available at http://policy.cps.k12.il.us/
documents/705.5.pdf.
84
HOUS. INDEP. SCH. DIST., CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 14 (2010), available at
http://www.houstonisd.org/HISDConnectEnglish/Images/PDF/2010Code_Eng_online.pdf.
85
EAST CARROLL PARISH SCH. SYST., A COMPACT FOR STUDENT
SUCCESS/STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE 45-47, available at http://www.e-carrollschools.org/
docs/codeofconduct.pdf.
86
GUILFORD CNTY. SCH., 2010-2011 STUDENT HANDBOOK 8 (2010), available
at http://www.gcsnc.com/education/school/school.php?sectionid=33789 (follow “Student
Handbook” hyperlink).
87
NELSON CNTY. PUB. SCH. DIV., STUDENT CONDUCT 2-3 (2011), available at
http://www.nelson.k12.va.us/District/Policy/Section%20J/JFC.pdf.
88
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2009) (defining crime of “Interference
with or disruption of an educational institution”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (West
2010) (defining crime of “Disturbance of peace of school, community college, university
or state university”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West 2000) (defining crime of
“Disturbing schools and religious and other assemblies”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 40 (West 2000) (defining crime of “Disturbance of schools or assemblies”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 392.910 (2008) (defining as unlawful misdemeanor “Disturbance of
school”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2003) (defining crime of “Disturbing schools”);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-6 (2004) (defining “Disturbance of school” as a
misdemeanor); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.123 (West 2006) (defining “Disruptive
Activities” at a public school as a misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-710
(LexisNexis 2009) (criminalizing “Disruption of activities in or near school building”);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.635-030 (West 2009) (defining crime of “Disturbing
school, school activities or meetings”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-14 (LexisNexis 2010)
(defining crime of “Disturbance of schools”); see also Julius Menacker & Richard Mertz,
State Legislative Responses to School Crime, 85 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1993) (reviewing
statutes in thirty-six states relating to school crime specifically).
FOR THE
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talking back to teachers.89 In 1994, the South Carolina Attorney
General issued an opinion stating that students who fight in
school, fail to leave school grounds upon request, or use foul or
offensive language toward a principal or teacher are subject to
criminal prosecution.90
As a result of these policy developments, schoolchildren
today are more likely to be arrested and prosecuted for schoolbased misconduct than they were a generation ago.91 According
to the Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice, the
number of referrals to the juvenile justice system for relatively
minor school-based conduct is on the rise.92 Given this shift
toward criminalization, the administration of school discipline
appears to be increasingly adversarial.
B.

Rates of School-Based Referrals to Law Enforcement

Simply acknowledging that law enforcement intersects
with school discipline more often than it did in the past does
not fully resolve the issues posed by current doctrine. Even
T.L.O. conceded that law enforcement sometimes overlaps with
school discipline; it concluded, however, that the incidence of
convergence is sufficiently rare to warrant treating the two
institutions distinctly. The key issue, then, is the scope of the
convergence. This section examines empirical studies
measuring school-based student referrals to law enforcement to
assess the extent to which school discipline remains discrete
from law enforcement. A school-based referral to law
enforcement may take several forms. I use the term “schoolbased law enforcement referral” to refer to incidents in which a
youth is arrested at school or for school-related conduct, which
sometimes but not always results in the youth being processed
through the juvenile or criminal court system. It also includes
incidents in which the youth is not arrested, but is processed
89

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-507 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-106(a)
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-916 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-303 (2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2003).
90
1994 S.C. Op. Att’y Gen. 62 (No 94-25).
91
See, e.g., DAVID E. GROSSMANN & MAURICE PORTLEY, NAT’L COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING
COURT PRACTICE IN DELINQUENCY CASES 150-51 (2005) (expressing concern over use of
juvenile court to handle school misconduct); Bob Herbert, School to Prison Pipeline, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A15; Krezmien et al., supra note 9, at 275; Gara LaMarche, The
Time Is Right to End “Zero Tolerance” in Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 6, 2011, at 35.
92
FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2010)
(“[S]chool discipline problems (even minor ones) are increasingly being handled by law
enforcement rather than by schools.”).
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through the juvenile or criminal justice systems or is required
to respond to a criminal citation.
The analysis draws from several recently published studies.
None of these studies purports to determine why some schools rely
on law enforcement to maintain discipline while others do not. A
wide range of causal factors may be at play, ranging from attitudes
of school officials to limits on funding for traditional classroom
management techniques. Determining the underlying causes for
differing rates of referrals is beyond the scope of this article.
Rather, this article seeks to provide a descriptive assessment of
school officials’ reliance on law enforcement.
The studies examined here differ somewhat in
methodology and jurisdictions examined. Nonetheless,
collectively, they provide useful guides to assess the degree of
intersection between school discipline and law enforcement.
Specifically, the studies provide data on three important
indicators, namely: (1) the share of juvenile law enforcement
referrals that stem from school-based misconduct, (2) the
number of school-based law enforcement referrals per one
thousand enrolled students per year, and (3) the types of
offenses for which students are referred to law enforcement.
Percentage of law enforcement referrals resulting
from school-based misconduct: The percentage of youth
referrals to law enforcement stemming from school-based
misconduct provides a useful empirical measure of the extent to
which school discipline and law enforcement converge. A finding
that school-based referrals represent a large share of the overall
number of law enforcement referrals would challenge the
doctrinal view that school discipline is categorically discrete
from law enforcement. In addition, it would suggest that a
relatively large share of juvenile arrests and investigations
occurs without the guarantees of Miranda warnings and
probable cause, since these protections generally are not
constitutionally required for school-based investigations.93
According to a recent assessment of the National
Incident Based Reporting System, which maintains records of
crime incidents from 20 percent of the nation’s police agencies,
approximately one in six (17 percent) juvenile arrests stems
from school-based misbehavior.94 This figure casts doubt on the
doctrinal contention that the investigation and punishment of
93
94

See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
Cook, Gottfredson & Na, supra note 9, at 319, 332.
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school misconduct categorically differ from investigation and
punishment for law enforcement purposes.
Moreover, data from jurisdiction-specific studies suggest
an extremely high degree of variance across jurisdictions. Statelevel data show that the share of juvenile court cases that
originate from school-based misconduct ranges from a low of 4
percent to a high of 43 percent.95 These data, limited to formal
referrals to juvenile court, do not provide a precise measure of
the share of youth law enforcement referrals that are schoolbased. They omit incidents in which a youth is referred to law
enforcement through an arrest at school, but charges are
dropped before a case is filed in juvenile court. They also omit
school-based law enforcement referrals that result in charges
being filed in adult criminal court rather than in juvenile court.96
The Annual Report for the North Carolina Department
of Juvenile Justice indicates that 43 percent (16,140 out of
37,584) of offenses that result in referral to the juvenile justice
system are school based.97 A recently published survey by
education scholar Michael Krezmien and colleagues finds far
lower rates in the five states for which it was able to obtain
data: Arizona, Hawaii, Missouri, South Carolina, and West
Virginia.98 Among those states, West Virginia exhibited the
highest share of court referrals that were school based, with
approximately 17 percent of juvenile cases originating in
schools, while Hawaii exhibited the lowest share, with only 4
percent originating in schools.99 While it is not clear that the
North Carolina report and the multistate study employed a
sufficiently similar methodology to permit precise comparison,
the results of the two reports suggest wide variance across
states in the extent to which law enforcement is used to
maintain school order.100
95

See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
The number of school-based law enforcement referrals that result in
charges being filed in adult criminal court is likely to be particularly large in
jurisdictions such as North Carolina, where youth aged sixteen or older are
automatically processed through the adult criminal courts, regardless of the offense.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1604 (West 2004).
97
N.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, ANNUAL
REPORT 21 (2010), available at http://www.ncdjjdp.org/resources/pdf_documents/annual_
report_2010.pdf.
98
Krezmien et al., supra note 9, at 283.
99
See id.
100
Similarly, according to a recent study by the Council for State Governments,
only 6 percent of youth referrals to the juvenile court system in Texas (5349 out of 85,548
formal referrals) came directly from schools. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR. &
PUB. POLICY RESEARCH INST., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW
96
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A study of county-level data in Florida suggests that even
within a given state, the extent to which law enforcement
converges with school discipline varies considerably.101 According to
the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, the statewide share of
juvenile court referrals that stem from conduct on public school
grounds, at a school bus stop, or at a school event is approximately
15 percent.102 The rates for individual counties, however, diverge
significantly from this baseline. In Gulf and Dixie Counties the
percentage of delinquency referrals for school-based misconduct
was only 8 percent, while in other counties more than a quarter of
delinquency cases came from schools: Okeechobee (29 percent), St.
Lucie (27 percent), Hamilton (27 percent), Jackson (26 percent),
and Marion Counties (26 percent).103 Again, these data are limited
to cases resulting in a referral to juvenile court; they omit cases in
which students are arrested but released before juvenile court
charges are filed, and they omit cases in which youth are
processed through the adult criminal justice system.104
Although differences in methodology across the studies
limit to some degree the comparability of these data, the studies
suggest that school discipline practices vary widely across
jurisdictions. At the low end, in some jurisdictions as few as 4
percent of juvenile court cases may originate in schools; at the high
end, as many as 43 percent may originate from schools.105
Nonetheless, the data demonstrate that in at least some
jurisdictions it has become difficult to defend the claim that school
discipline differs categorically from law enforcement, or that school
discipline serves educational rather than police purposes. The
heavy reliance on law enforcement to maintain school order
suggests that one can no longer assume a nonadversarial,
benevolent relationship between school disciplinarian and student.
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
INVOLVEMENT xii n.2 (2011) [hereinafter BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES], available at
http://justicecenter.csg.org/resources/juveniles. This figure likely understates the actual
rate of law enforcement referral by schools because it appears to exclude incidents in
which a police officer who is summoned to the school is the one to formally file a
delinquency petition, a student is arrested at school but subsequently released without
the filing of a juvenile court petition, or a student is processed through municipal rather
than juvenile court.
101
FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR PROGRAM ACCOUNTABILITY,
DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS: A SIX-YEAR STUDY (2010) [hereinafter
DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS], available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/research/
School_Referrals/FY-2009-10-Delinquency-in-Schools-Analysis.pdf.
102
In absolute numbers, the data show that there were 18,467 school-related
delinquency referrals, out of a total 121,689 delinquency referrals statewide. Id. at 3.
103
Id. at 4.
104
Id. at 2.
105
See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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Number of school-based law enforcement referrals
per one thousand enrolled students per year: Data showing
rates of school-based law enforcement referrals per one thousand
students per year likewise permit an evaluation of the claim
that school discipline differs categorically from law enforcement.
Where the rates of school-based arrest and referral are relatively
high, the claim that the investigation and punishment of school
misconduct furthers educational rather than law enforcement
purposes becomes harder to defend. A number of recently
published studies provide data on this measure. These data
show that, as with the proportion of juvenile court referrals
stemming from school-based misconduct, rates of school-based
law enforcement referrals per one thousand enrolled students
vary significantly across jurisdictions.106
The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice’s Annual
Report calculates the number of school-related delinquency
referrals per one thousand students enrolled in grades six
through twelve; statewide, there were thirteen (13) schoolrelated delinquency referrals per one thousand middle and
high school students.107 Rates of school-based delinquency
referrals varied dramatically across counties within Florida,
though, from a low of only four (4) school-related delinquency
referrals per one thousand students in Lafayette and Nassau
Counties, to a high of forty-two (42) and fifty (50) referrals per
one thousand students in Hamilton and Putnam Counties,
respectively.108 These figures understate the actual incidence of
school-based law enforcement referral because they omit
instances in which a student is arrested at school but released
before charges are filed in juvenile court, and they omit cases
referred to adult criminal court.
Even greater variability exists in Texas. The advocacy
organization Texas Appleseed recently published its analysis of
rates of school-based arrests in seventeen districts where data

106

These figures do not purport to estimate the likelihood that a given student
will be subject to school-based law enforcement, because some students may have been
referred to law enforcement more than once.
107
DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS, supra note 101, at 5.
108
The multistate study found a smaller range, from a low of two (2) schoolbased juvenile court cases per one thousand students enrolled in Hawaii, to a high of
nine (9) cases per one thousand students in Missouri. These data, which unlike the
Florida report include elementary school students, understate the arrest rate for
middle and high school students who are arrested at higher rates than their younger
counterparts. Krezmien, supra note 9, at 278.
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were available.109 The study, analyzing data from seventeen
districts representing 13 percent of the state’s student body,
found that at the low end of the spectrum there were one-and-ahalf (1.5) and two (2) school-based arrests per one thousand
enrolled students in Castleberry and Wichita Falls districts,
respectively.110 At the high end of the spectrum, East Central
reported fifty-one (51) arrests for every one thousand students.111
These data also understate the actual incidence of school-based
law enforcement referral, as they omit instances in which a
student is referred to juvenile court without being arrested at
school, such as when the student receives a summons to appear
in lieu of arrest. Unlike the figures for Florida, these figures
include elementary school students as well as middle and high
school students; had the data excluded elementary school
students, rates of school-based arrests per one-thousand enrolled
middle and high school students would be higher.112
The Texas Appleseed study also provides data on the
issuance of misdemeanor tickets in public schools.113 These
citations require the recipient to appear in municipal court and
may result in fines of up to $500; a failure to appear subjects
the individual to a bench warrant for arrest.114 Data from the
twenty-six districts for which data were available again show
wide disparities in the administration of punishment.115 At the
lower end of the scale, United and Humble districts each issued
fourteen (14) criminal citations per one thousand enrolled
students,116 while at the high end, Galveston issued 109
citations per one thousand enrolled students.117 In Texas alone,
then, there are as few as one-and-a-half (1.5) to as many as
fifty-one (51) school-based arrests per one thousand enrolled

109

TEX. APPLESEED, TEXAS’ SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: TICKETING, ARREST
USE OF FORCE IN SCHOOLS 101 (2010) [hereinafter TEXAS APPLESEED], available at
http://www.texasappleseed.net/images/stories/reports/Ticketing_Booklet_web.pdf.
110
Id. at 104-05.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 114 (documenting data showing that majority of school-based arrests
are for high school students).
113
Id. at 67-96.
114
Id. at 69.
115
Id. at 67-96.
116
Id. at 77-78 (indicating 522 tickets issued in United Independent School
District, which enrolls 37,671 students, and 431 tickets issued in Humble Independent
School District, which enrolls 31,144 students).
117
Id. at 77 (indicating 921 tickets issued in the Galveston Independent
School District, which enrolls 8,430 students).
AND
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students, and as few as fourteen (14) and as many as 109
misdemeanor citations per one thousand of these students.118
Types of behaviors for which students are subject to
law enforcement referral: An examination of the types of
behaviors for which students are referred to law enforcement
provides another useful indicator to evaluate the factual
supposition that school discipline differs categorically from the
criminal process. Where law enforcement is being deployed to
address student behavior that traditionally would have been
handled more informally—through the imposition of after-school
detention or suspension—the resulting adversarial relationship
belies the claim that the intervention pedagogically benefits the
punished student.
The South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice’s
Annual Report indicates that “disturbance of schools”
represents the single most frequent offense resulting in a
referral to juvenile court.119 Conduct resulting in a charge of
“disturbance of schools” may not amount to conduct that would
result in an assault charge or other more serious offenses.
These data indicate that South Carolina schools heavily rely on
law enforcement and juvenile courts to handle conduct that
would not amount to a crime outside of the school context.
According to the Florida Department of Juvenile
Justice, two-thirds of all school-related delinquency referrals
involved misdemeanors, while one-third involved felonies.120
Misdemeanor assault and battery and disorderly conduct
violations represented the largest segment of school-based
delinquency referrals, at 21 percent and 15 percent,
respectively.121 Weapons offenses counted for approximately 5
percent of all school-related delinquency referrals.122
The Texas Appleseed study found that among the
twenty-two districts that disaggregated criminal citations by
offense, more than half the tickets were for disorderly conduct
(e.g., profanity, offensive gesture, or fighting) or disruption of
class or transportation.123 An additional 10 percent of the tickets

118

See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 2009-2010 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT
4 (2010), available at http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010%20Annual%20Statistical%
20Report.pdf.
120
DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS, supra note 101, at 8.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 109, at 82.
119
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were for violations of curfew or the Student Code of Conduct.124
Among the eleven school districts that disaggregated data on
school-based arrests by offense, 24 percent of school-based
arrests were for disorderly conduct125
Anecdotal newspaper accounts provide further
corroboration that some schools rely on police to handle
relatively minor forms of student misbehavior. In Lucas
County, Ohio, the majority of school-related referrals to
juvenile court were for disruptive conduct, while only
approximately 2 percent were for more serious incidents such
as assaulting a teacher or taking a gun to school.126 In Lafayette
Parish, Louisiana, 46 percent of school-based arrests were for
disturbing the peace or simple assault or battery, while 4
percent were for weapons or drug offenses.127 According to the
presiding family court judge in Birmingham, Alabama, only
approximately 7 percent of school-based arrests involved
offenses that actually warranted arrest, such as weapons
offenses or other felonies.128 In some jurisdictions, then, school
officials appear to have delegated their traditional authority to
handle common forms of student misconduct—such as those
involving disruptive behavior or fights—to law enforcement.
Data from these studies suggest that in some, but not
all, jurisdictions it has become more difficult to claim that
students accused of misconduct are investigated and punished
for their own educational benefit, or that efforts to maintain
school order are justified by pedagogical goals, not law
enforcement ones. Rather, at the high end of the range, up to
43 percent of youth referrals to law enforcement involve school
misconduct, and there are up to fifty (50) school-based referrals
to juvenile court, fifty-one (51) school-based arrests, and 109
criminal citations for every one thousand students enrolled in
public schools per year.129 Nonetheless, these figures are not
typical of all jurisdictions. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, as few
as 4 percent of juvenile court cases stem from school
124

Id.
Id. at 107.
Sara Rimer, Unruly Students Facing Arrest, Not Detention, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/04/us/unruly-studentsfacing-arrest-not-detention.html?%20pagewanted=al&src=pm.
127
Marsha Sills, Parish Schools See Reduced Violence, BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
May 30, 2009, at B1.
128
Marie Leech & Carol Robinson, Birmingham City Schools Rely on Arrests to
Keep Order, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Mar. 22, 2009, 6:19 AM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/
2009/03/city_schools_rely_on_arrests_t.html.
129
See supra notes 97, 109, 113, 119 and accompanying text.
125
126
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misconduct, and there may only be four (4) school-based court
referrals, one (1) or two (2) school-based arrests, and fourteen
(14) criminal citations per one thousand students per year.130
C.

Educational Impact of Law Enforcement Referrals

The increasing reliance on law enforcement referrals to
maintain school order challenges the assumption that school
discipline furthers educational interests. Whatever might be
said about the pedagogical value of suspensions or other more
traditional forms of school discipline, the available social
science shows that referring a student to law enforcement has
130

See supra notes 100, 109, 111, 118 and accompanying text. An examination
of the causes for these disparities is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is
worth noting that the disparities are not entirely randomized. As sociologist Paul
Hirschfield has observed, “criminalization in middle class schools is less intense and
more fluid than in the inner-city, where proximate or immediate crime threats are
overriding concerns.” Hirschfield, supra note 9, at 84; see also Maureen Carroll,
Comment, Educating Expelled Students After No Child Left Behind: Mending an
Incentive Structure that Discourages Alternative Education and Reinstatement, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1909, 1934-37 (2008) (discussing racial disparities and discrimination in
school discipline); Heather Cobb, Separate and Unequal: The Disparate Impact of
School-Based Referrals to Juvenile Court, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 581 (2009)
(same); Elizabeth E. Hall, Criminalizing Our Youth: The School-to-Prison Pipeline v.
the Constitution, 4 S. REG’L BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 75 (2010) (same). A
qualitative study conducting interviews with law enforcement officers deployed to
public schools across Massachusetts concluded that larger, urban school districts rely on
arrests to maintain school discipline more heavily than suburban and rural school
districts; officers stated that in urban school districts, school officials prioritized sending a
“get tough” message, while those in affluent suburban schools with predominantly white
populations prioritized preserving the reputation of their students and the school. Thurau
& Wald, supra note 8, at 988, 1010. Given the disproportionate representation of minority
students in urban schools, it may come as no surprise that students of color bear the
brunt of the trend toward increased criminalization. According to the multistate study
described in the text, the likelihood of school-based law enforcement referrals for Latino
students in Arizona is three times higher than for white students; the rate for black
students is twice as high as for white students. Krezmien et al., supra note 9, at 14. The
Advancement Project reports similar trends, finding that black youth are more than two
times more likely to be referred to law enforcement at school than white students in
Colorado, two-and-a-half times more likely in Florida, and three-and-a-half times more
likely in Philadelphia. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW
“ZERO TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TOPRISON PIPELINE 19 (2010), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/
files/publications/rev_fin.pdf. Moreover, a report by the American Civil Liberties Union
suggests these racial disparities cannot be blamed exclusively on differences across
school districts or differences in students’ behavior. It found that black students
involved in physical altercations are twice as likely to be arrested at school in the same
district as white students who commit the same acts; likewise, black and Latino
students who commit drug offenses at school are ten times more likely to be arrested
than white students who commit drug offenses in the same district. ACLU, HARD
LESSONS: SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS AND SCHOOL-BASED ARRESTS IN
THREE CONNECTICUT TOWNS 26 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
racialjustice/hardlessons_november2008.pdf.
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negative educational consequences not only on the youth
referred, but also likely on the larger student body.
1. Educational Impact on the Punished Student
Behavioral theories posit three competing models of the
relationship between harsh punishments and youth outcomes:
deterrence theory, propensity theory, and labeling theory.131
Deterrence theory, as its name suggests, posits that formal
behavioral interventions deter youth from future deviant
behavior. Propensity theory suggests that harsh punishments
neither encourage nor discourage future deviant conduct; any
relationship between the punishment and future behavior is
correlative rather than causative, because the same inherent
traits that led to the first instance of misconduct will lead to
future deviance. Conversely, labeling theory suggests that harsh
punishments for youth will actually increase future misconduct
by labeling the youth as a deviant and creating a deviant selfconcept with potentially life-altering consequences; others may
also come to identify the youth as a deviant, thereby foreclosing
opportunities that would otherwise have been available. Among
the three competing theories, only deterrence theory supports
the doctrinal assumption that punitive forms of school discipline
such as a school-based arrest or law enforcement referral further
the educational interests of the punished youth.
In fact, the available empirical evidence lends no
support for the deterrence theory with respect to law
enforcement referrals for school-based offenses. On the
contrary, social science consistently shows that a law
enforcement referral has significant negative consequences on
youth educational outcomes. Among the more recent research,
a 2006 study by criminologist Gary Sweeten assessed the
relationship between law enforcement referral and educational
attainment. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth, a nationally representative sample, the study found
that a first-time arrest during high school years nearly doubles
the likelihood of dropping out of high school; an arrest coupled
with a court appearance quadruples the likelihood.132 The
magnitude of this effect holds, even after controlling for other
factors thought to influence dropout rates including being held
131

See Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School
Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 463 (2006).
132
Id. at 473.
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back a grade, living in a single-parent household, poor prior
academic performance, and rates of delinquent conduct.133
Similarly, a 2009 study by sociologist Paul Hirschfield assessed
the impact of a first-time arrest on high school dropout rates in
Chicago.134 Drawing a sample of students in Chicago Public
Schools with high concentrations of low-income and minority
students, it found that those who were arrested in ninth or
tenth grade were six to eight times more likely to drop out of
high school as classmates who were not arrested, even after
controlling for variables including prior delinquency, peer
delinquency, truancy, academic achievement, and anger
control.135 A number of other studies have drawn similar
conclusions regarding the negative impact of arrest on high
school graduation rates.136
None of these studies specifically examines the impact
of an arrest when it occurs on school grounds or for schoolrelated conduct. Yet, there is no reason to think that the
negative educational impact of school-based arrest would be
any less than the negative educational impact of arrest
generally. On the contrary, given the importance of school
officials and students maintaining positive relationships, one
would expect that the negative impact of an arrest would be
exacerbated when the arrest occurs at school. Further research
should be conducted on this question. Nonetheless, in light of
the findings to date, the use of school-based law enforcement
referrals cannot currently be defended on the ground that it
educationally benefits the referred youth.
2. Educational Impact on Other Students
Moreover, there is little empirical support for the claim
that the use of law enforcement to maintain school order
accrues educational benefits to the larger student population.
It may well be true that if one student persistently disrupts the
classroom, removal of that student enhances the remaining
students’ ability to learn.137 However, there is no evidence
133

Id. at 478.
Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile Arrests on High
School Dropout, 82 SOC. OF EDUC. 368, 369 (2009).
135
Id. at 368.
136
Id. at 370.
137
See Cook et al., supra note 9, at 372 (“Clearly, removing troublemakers
from school helps maintain an environment more suitable for learning for the
remaining students.”).
134
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suggesting that referring the student to law enforcement
specifically⎯in lieu of or in addition to some other mechanism
such as traditional suspension⎯improves the educational
climate for the remaining students. Indeed, a recent metaanalysis of 178 individual studies assessing the effectiveness of
different school-based disciplinary interventions found no
evidence that the use of arrest and juvenile courts to handle
school disorder reduces the occurrence of problem behavior in
schools.138 Some scholars have reasoned that, by creating
adversarial and distrustful relationships between law
enforcement and school authorities on the one hand, and the
student body on the other, coercive police-like interventions may
actually increase school disorder. Education scholars Matthew
Mayer and Peter Leone analyzed data from the National Crime
Victimization Survey to assess the relationship between coercive
school security measures and educational climate and found that
restrictive measures such as the use of security personnel, metal
detectors, and locker searches were not only associated with
higher levels of school disorder, but also possibly caused that
disorder. Based on these findings they concluded, “creating an
unwelcoming, almost jail-like, heavily scrutinized environment,
may foster the violence and disorder school administrators hope
to avoid.”139 Similarly, one criminologist recently expressed
concern that “aggressive security measures produce alienation
and mistrust among students” and such measures “can disrupt
the learning environment and create an adversarial relationship
between school officials and students,”140 while another
criminologist suggested that the use of aggressive law
enforcement tactics in schools “may cause students to distrust
educational and law enforcement authorities which could
motivate students to engage in greater delinquency.”141 Far from
suggesting that law enforcement referrals improve the
educational climate for remaining students, the limited evidence
to date has led experts to conclude that such referrals likely
compromise educational goals.
The primary doctrinal justifications for restricting the
procedural rights of youth when they are investigated or
138

See id. at 369.
Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analysis of School
Violence and Disruption: Implications for Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. &
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 333, 349 (1999).
140
Randall R. Beger, The Worst of Both Worlds, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 340 (2003).
141
Brown, supra note 9, at 599.
139
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punished for misconduct⎯that such investigations and
punishments serve the youth’s educational interests and that
they differ categorically from law enforcement⎯prove
considerably less persuasive in light of evidence of
contemporary school discipline practices and their likely
educational impact on students. Whatever might be said about
the more traditional school discipline practices of suspension or
paddling, it can hardly be argued that school-based arrest is “a
valuable educational device”142 or has “long been an accepted
method of promoting good behavior and instilling notions of
responsibility . . . into the mischievous heads of school
children.”143 In jurisdictions where school officials frequently
remove students from schools through formal arrest or the
filing of a delinquency petition, one can no longer claim that
the interests of the investigating school official and the student
are aligned rather than adversarial. The next part explores the
implications of these findings.
III.

INCORPORATING CONSIDERATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL
IMPACT OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

The developing body of empirical evidence in the
preceding part challenges the doctrinal justification for denying
procedural protections to youth who are accused of misconduct
in schools. To the extent school discipline increasingly takes the
form of law enforcement referrals, it can no longer be justified by
the educational benefits it confers on the child or its purportedly
nonadversarial nature. Those rationales for insulating
traditional forms of school discipline from constitutional
protections simply no longer apply in jurisdictions that rely on
law enforcement to maintain order in schools.
Changes in the operation of school discipline parallel
the evolution of the juvenile justice system decades ago. Until
the 1960s, youth in juvenile court were denied the
constitutional procedural protections afforded to adults in
criminal court on the ground that the juvenile court, unlike the
adult criminal court, was assumed to act in a nonadversarial
manner in furtherance of the accused youth’s interests—to
rehabilitate rather than punish the youth.144 By the 1960s,
142

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967) (“[I]t is urged that the juvenile
benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early conception of the Juvenile
143
144
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however, emerging social science evidence on actual juvenile
court practices and their impact on the emotional and social
development of youth cast doubt on those earlier premises:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the
process from the reach of constitutional guarantees available to
adults.145

The Supreme Court reasoned that “neither sentiment nor
folklore should cause us to shut our eyes” to these studies.146
Evaluating this evidence, it concluded first in Kent v. United
States that juveniles had the “worst of both worlds”—neither
the nurturing benefit of a nonadversarial system, nor the
procedural protections of adult criminal court.147 One year later,
in In re Gault, it found that “[t]he rhetoric of the juvenile court
movement has developed without any necessarily close
correspondence to the realities of court and institutional
routines.”148 In light of empirical developments, the Court
reversed decades of precedent to extend to juveniles many of
the constitutional procedural protections previously reserved
for individuals in the adult criminal system.
Similarly, recent empirical evidence suggests that
school discipline practices may no longer advance the
beneficent, nonadversarial goals that once insulated them from
ordinary judicial scrutiny. In light of the growing divergence
between stated goals and actual practices in school discipline,
courts should reconsider the validity of doctrinal restrictions on
procedural rights in the school discipline context, just as the
Supreme Court did for juvenile courts in Gault. This part sets
forth a framework for courts to do so. In addition, it discusses
the potential role of nonjudicial actors in reform efforts.

Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of
the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and
admonition . . . .”).
145
Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 554-56 (1966).
146
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21.
147
383 U.S. at 556.
148
387 U.S. at 30 (citation omitted).
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A Context-Specific Approach to Procedural Protections in
Courts

In light of the empirical evidence showing an increased
reliance on law enforcement to maintain public school order and
the educational harms associated with this increased reliance,
courts should critically evaluate the operation of school
discipline to ensure that it actually advances the educational
interests that previously justified insulating school discipline
from closer judicial scrutiny.149 Given how significantly school
discipline practices vary across jurisdictions, however, this
analysis should be location-specific.150
The framework proposed here preserves the presumption
that school discipline generally serves pedagogical goals, but
permits the youth to rebut this presumption by showing that
discipline practices in the youth’s particular school or district do
not further educational interests. Relevant evidence might
include, for example, data showing high rates of school-based
arrests in the school or district, the frequent use of school-based
arrests to handle relatively minor misconduct, or expert
testimony regarding the educational impact of particular
disciplinary practices employed in the school or district.
Reviewing this evidence, the court would render an
interpretive judgment as to whether the particular discipline
practices in a school or district primarily further a law
enforcement goal rather than an educational one. Where the
court finds the evidence persuasive, investigations of student
misconduct would be presumed adversarial and thus subject to
the full scope of constitutional protections that would be
available to youth outside of the school context. By contrast,
where school discipline practices adhere to the traditional model
of discipline furthering pedagogical goals, doctrinal restrictions
on constitutional rights would remain in place. Thus, the
availability of procedural protections for youth in public schools
would depend on a jurisdiction-specific assessment, rather than
a categorical assumption, of the educational benefit of school

149

See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 254, 310-11 (2011) (critiquing current “one-size-permits-everything” categorical
approach to administrative searches such as those conducted in public schools).
150
See also Anthony V. Alfieri, Post-Racialism in the Inner City: Structure and
Culture in Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 921, 959-60 (2010) (urging development of “local,
school-specific fact investigation” to examine impact of school-based law enforcement
referrals on youth).
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discipline practices. This framework ensures that the education
of youth is the paramount interest served.
There are a number of potential objections to this
contextualized approach. First, one might argue that even if
school discipline no longer serves the student’s educational
interests, procedural rights should remain limited to protect the
interests of other students. Second, a critic might contend that
even though jurisdictions differ in their reliance on law
enforcement, a categorical rule that assumes that school
discipline always furthers the educational interests of youth is
preferable because it is easier to administer. Third, one might
argue that a better approach would be to employ an
individualized analysis to determine whether the investigation
of misconduct in a particular case furthers educational goals.
Fourth, one might object to this type of contextualized rule on
the ground that it would improperly result in constitutional
protections varying by geography (e.g., probable cause required
for searches in schools in district A, but not in district B). Fifth
and finally, the framework is subject to the criticism that courts
should not be in the business of second-guessing the educational
value of school discipline. This section addresses each in turn.
Rejecting reliance on the interests of other students.
One might argue that even if the relationship between
investigating official and accused student is recognized as
adversarial and in service of law enforcement, procedural
restrictions may remain warranted because the interests of the
individual student are outweighed by the countervailing
interests of other students in learning without disruption.151 The
Supreme Court has noted this concern about preserving the
rights of other students in some cases.152 This view does not
necessarily hold that the ordinary calculus weighing individual
interests against collective interests does not apply, but rather
that the collective interest in school order weighs so heavily as to
overcome the competing individual student’s interest in securing
the full scope of procedural protections.
151

See Ryan, supra note 6, at 1341, 1411-14 (interpreting limits on
constitutional rights in school discipline cases as resting on the view that they are
necessary to “preserve an atmosphere that is safe and conducive to learning” and “to
maintain discipline in order to transmit academic knowledge”); see also Tribe, supra
note 7, at 314 n.128 (“[E]ven if in general the teachers’ and child’s interest truly
converge, at the moment of suspension convergence must surely turn into clash: the
teacher is saying that the best interests of other students will be served by this
particular student’s suspension.”).
152
See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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As a purely doctrinal matter, this approach is not
entirely satisfactory. Relying on the interests of other students
fails to articulate why the collective interest in school order
should outweigh the collective interest in, say, reducing violent
crimes in neighborhoods. It sets up the same tension between
individual interests and collective interests that exists for all
criminal procedural protections. Perhaps for this reason, the
Court has never relied exclusively on this rationale, instead
using it to buttress its primary rationale—that the collective
interests and the individual student’s interests are aligned.
Moreover, as an empirical matter, there is little
evidentiary support in the literature for the claim that the use of
law enforcement, rather than other forms of discipline, in fact
advances the educational interests of other students. On the
contrary, as set forth in the preceding part, social scientists from
related disciplines in education, criminology, and sociology
suggest that heavy reliance on policing measures in public
schools generates an adversarial atmosphere that may
compromise the educational environment for all students.153
Rejecting a categorical rule. The proposed contextspecific approach to determining the scope of procedural rights is
preferable to an alternative categorical regime notwithstanding
concerns of administrability. Concededly, the current categorical
rule that exempts school searches from probable cause
requirements and presumes school officials are not agents of the
police for Miranda purposes is easy for courts to apply
consistently; courts and litigants are not required to engage in a
potentially costly fact-specific assessment of actual school
discipline practices.154 A defense of the current categorical rule
might reason that schools in general continue to use school
discipline to further educational interests, even if some schools
depart from this norm; thus, the factual premise on which the
doctrinal restrictions rest⎯that school discipline and law
enforcement generally remain discrete⎯remains accurate most
of the time.
Such reliance on generalities is explicitly permissible
pursuant to the Mathews v. Eldridge framework for
determining procedural rights in the civil context, which
assesses the risk of error associated with the denial of
153

See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38-41 (1994) (describing
normative reasons for preferring nationally uniform legal rules).
154
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procedural protections in the “generality of cases, not the rare
exceptions.”155 Under this view, restrictions on procedural rights
are warranted so long as school discipline “generally” is
discrete from law enforcement, and disciplinarians “rarely”
stand in an adversarial position vis a vis students.
The increasing availability of relevant data mitigates
this concern about administrability. Federal agencies have
amended the biannual federal Civil Rights Data Collection to
require school districts to maintain and publicly report data on
the total number of student referrals to law enforcement and
the total number of school-related arrests for each school.156
These mandatory data-collection and reporting requirements
reduce the litigation costs associated with obtaining and
analyzing this information.
More importantly, the primary purpose of uniform,
categorical rules is to ensure that “similarly situated litigants
are treated equally.”157 Where the facts show that litigants are
not, in fact, similarly situated in a legally significant way, the
application of the same rule to them is no longer appropriate.158
In addition, reliance on generalities in the name of efficiency is
inappropriate where, as here, criminal—as opposed to civil—
procedures are implicated.159 As Jerry L. Mashaw has pointed
155

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 344 (1976) (stating that
determination of what process is due in the administrative context requires balancing
of three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.”); see, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (applying Mathews
framework to determine procedural due process rights to challenge school suspension);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977) (same for corporal punishment); Doe ex
rel. Doe v. Todd Cnty. Sch. Dist., 625 F.3d 459, 462-64 (8th Cir. 2010) (same for
placement in an alternative high school setting); Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242
F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (same for expulsion); Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90,
95 (3d Cir. 1989) (same for suspension from interscholastic athletics); Newsome v.
Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 923-24 (6th Cir. 1988) (same for expulsion); In
re Expulsion of E.J.W. from Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 500, 632 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001) (same); Hinds Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. ex rel. D.L.B., 10 So. 3d
387, 399-402 (Miss. 2008) (same).
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OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2009-10 CIVIL RIGHTS
DATA COLLECTION, OMB 1875-0240 (on file with author).
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See Caminker, supra note 154, at 39-40.
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See generally Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion:
Cultural, Political, and Procedural Dynamics in California Juvenile Justice, 41 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 387 (2007) (discussing competing values of predictability and uniformity
while describing tension between individual justice versus equal justice).
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Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (rejecting applicability of
Mathews balancing framework for criminal procedural rights). But see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527-28 (2004).
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out, criminal procedural rules prohibit coerced confessions not
because they will yield inaccurate conclusions about
guilt⎯indeed, they are often all too accurate⎯but rather
because such confessions offend our basic sense of personal
autonomy.160 Our juvenile and criminal justice systems require
a more granular assessment of facts than the current
categorical rule provides.
Rejecting an individualized rule. In light of the need
for a more granular rule, one might argue in favor of an
individualized case-by-case assessment of whether procedural
rules should be extended to a particular student, instead of the
jurisdiction-specific rule proposed here. This alternative approach
might determine procedural rules depending on, for example,
whether a school resource officer was present or participated in
the particular search or questioning, or the subjective intent of
the school official in conducting the search or questioning.
This individualized alternative, however, would not be
workable. The presence or absence of a school resource officer
does not indicate whether a search or questioning was carried
out for law enforcement purposes. One recent study found that
the presence of school resource officers was not correlated with
the number of school-based arrests in a school.161 The particular
roles played by school resource officers differ significantly across
schools. In some schools they are charged with enforcement of
criminal laws, while in others they focus on mentoring,
counseling, and teaching.162 Because of this variability in roles,
school resource officers cannot neatly be categorized as law
enforcement or school official. The better approach to determine
whether school investigations serve law enforcement purposes is
one that examines aggregate data of rates of law enforcement
referrals in the particular school or district.
Nor would it be desirable for a court to attempt to discern
the subjective intent of individual school officials to determine
160

Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 904-05 (1981) (arguing that due process seeks to protect
dignitary value in privacy in the prohibition against coerced confessions and
unreasonable searches); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J.
455, 481 (1986) (suggesting core value of efficiency embodied in Mathews balancing test
differs from prior core due process value of fairness).
161
Theriot, supra note 9, at 284-85 (finding that the presence of school
resource officers does not predict more total arrests, but does predict more arrests for
disorderly conduct).
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PETER FINN & JACK MCDEVITT, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS 43 (2005).
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whether a particular search or interrogation was for law
enforcement purposes; this approach would present significant
evidentiary difficulties and potentially encourage false
statements from school officials. More importantly, such an
individualized rule would chill school principals, who might feel
pressured to provide Miranda warnings any time they
questioned a student about anything—even about not having a
hall pass—in case the student responded with incriminating
statements that might subsequently be excluded from court
because of a Miranda violation. The context-specific rule, by
contrast, would encourage school officials to provide procedural
protections only in schools or districts that routinely rely on law
enforcement, and not in those schools or districts that do not.
Accepting geographically contingent rules. A
fourth objection would challenge the proposed context-specific
rule because it would result in constitutional protections
varying by geography: probable cause and Miranda warnings
would be required for student investigations in district A, but
not in district B. There is precedent for these location-specific
constitutional protections, however.
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court concluded
that the question of whether flight from the police provides
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop-and-frisk depends on
background facts regarding the particular area⎯specifically,
the level of crime in that particular area.163 Here, courts would
employ a similar approach to reject the categorical rule denying
procedural protections in schools and instead determine the
entitlement to such protections based on the background facts
of student criminalization in the particular school or district. In
those schools or districts in which law enforcement goals were
shown to predominate over educational ones, courts would
demand probable cause and Miranda warnings for schoolbased investigations.164
Accepting educational assessments by courts: Finally,
one might object to the proposed context-specific approach on the
ground that courts should not be in the business of second-
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Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
See also Livingston, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that courts should
consider “character and social meaning” of encounters between officers and individuals
to determine whether the encounter furthers ordinary law enforcement goals and
should thus be subject to ordinary criminal procedural protections, or whether, instead,
the encounter lacks the adversarial relationship characteristic of law enforcement
encounters and should thus benefit from more relaxed procedural protections).
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guessing the decisions of school officials.165 As the Supreme Court
emphasized in the student speech case Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier, “the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the
responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school
officials, and not of federal judges.”166
Notwithstanding the deference afforded to school
officials, however, the Kuhlmeier decision affirmed the propriety
of judicial scrutiny over the educational value of school officials’
decisions. In Kuhlmeier, which involved censorship of a high
school newspaper published by students in a journalism class,
the Court held that even in the context of classroom activities,
where the deference afforded to school officials is greatest, it
would review a school official’s conduct to determine whether it
is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”167 If
courts are trusted with reviewing the educational goals of inclassroom decisions in the First Amendment context⎯albeit
pursuant to a forgiving standard of review⎯it is difficult to
understand why they should not be trusted with determining
whether particular discipline practices further educational goals
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts, which involve the
procedural rights of criminal suspects, an area in which courts
have particular expertise.168
B.

The Role of Nonjudicial Actors in Preserving the
Educational Value of School Discipline

Ultimately, courts have limited authority in shaping
school discipline. They may determine which procedural
protections will extend to youth who are investigated or
punished at school, but they lack the authority to determine
what kind of conduct warrants punishment, and what kind of
punishment should be imposed. They are poorly situated
institutionally to prevent criminal charges from being filed
against a student for engaging in a schoolyard shoving match
or cursing loudly in class.169 Therefore, a critical role exists for
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Buss, supra note 3, at 570 (discussing institutional disadvantages of
judicial determinations of school policies).
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484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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Buss, supra note 3, at 571 (noting that, although “the public school context may
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See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 563 (1992) (noting that robust procedural
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nonjudicial actors to ensure that these decisions are informed
by the educational impact of discipline practices.170 Even with
robust judicial procedural protections, nonjudicial actors
including school boards, principals, teachers, and individual
police officers will always retain a great deal of discretion in
determining how to handle student misconduct. In light of the
emerging empirical evidence, those charged with developing
discipline practices should reduce reliance on law enforcement
and instead institute practices that improve educational
outcomes for youth.
Policy makers in several jurisdictions have already
taken the lead in examining the intersection between school
discipline and law enforcement. For example, school officials in
Clayton County, Georgia, a part of the Atlanta Metro region,
convened a Blue Ribbon Commission to study school discipline
issues.171 In its report, the Commission found that in the span of
a few years, the number of student referrals to law
enforcement per year grew from eighty-nine to 1,400.172 The
Commission further found that most of the offenses involved
minor incidents such as fights or disorderly conduct that “have
traditionally been handled by the school and are not deemed
the type of matters appropriate for juvenile court.”173 Based on
these empirical findings, the chief judge of the local juvenile
court convened a group of local stakeholders including parents,
police officers, school officials, and juvenile public defenders to
discuss the use of the juvenile justice system to maintain
student discipline. After a series of roundtable meetings,
participants reached a resolution that would further school
safety and at the same time reduce the number of youth
referred to juvenile court for school-based misconduct. The
resulting cooperative agreement imposed a three-strikes policy
for disciplinary infractions.174 The first time a child commits
certain offenses identified as “focus acts”—affray, disruption of
school, disorderly conduct, minor obstruction of the police, and
protections mean little when there are no substantive limits to the government’s ability
to define impermissible behavior, as in the situation of a school principal).
170
Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2417 (2004) (discussing limits of litigation to create social change in education).
171
CLAYTON CNTY. PUB. SCH., BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE: A WRITTEN REPORT PRESENTED TO THE SUPERINTENDENT AND BOARD OF
EDUCATION (1997).
172
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173
Id.
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available
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902

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

criminal trespass—the student receives a warning rather than
being referred to law enforcement, as was the prior practice.175
If the youth commits one of these offenses a second time, the
child is referred to a school conflict-diversion program,
mediation program, or other court-sponsored program.176 It is
only if the student commits the offense a third time that he or
she may be referred to law enforcement.177
Importantly, the Cooperative Agreement has succeeded
not only in reducing the number of school-based arrests, but
also in improving school order and, according to its advocates,
educational outcomes. Since the agreement was implemented,
the number of dangerous weapons incidents decreased by 70
percent, fighting offenses decreased by 87 percent, and other
focus acts decreased by 36 percent.178 Advocates for the reform
effort maintain that the reduced reliance on school-based
arrests furthers safety goals by facilitating nonadversarial
relationships between students and authority figures.179 At the
same time, graduation rates increased by 20 percent, although
it is not clear that this can be attributed to the reduced reliance
on law enforcement.180 Similar community reform efforts are
underway in Denver, Baltimore, Raleigh, San Francisco,
Atlanta, and Birmingham.181 These efforts suggest the
possibility of effective reform by nonjudicial actors to ensure
that mechanisms for maintaining school order actually benefit
the educational interests of students.
CONCLUSION
Emerging empirical evidence casts significant doubt on
the ongoing validity of doctrinal justifications for denying
procedural protections to youth accused of misconduct in
schools. Where a growing number of jurisdictions are relying on
175
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law enforcement to maintain school order, the investigation
and punishment of youth can no longer categorically be
insulated from judicial scrutiny on the ground that it furthers
the educational interests of the suspect-youth. Just as the
Supreme Court in Gault confronted emerging factual evidence
regarding the operation of the juvenile justice system to extend
fuller procedural protections to youth in juvenile court, courts
should consider how school discipline actually operates in
today’s society and revisit the scope of procedural protections
available to youth in public schools accordingly.
This article provides a descriptive assessment of the
increased criminalization of school discipline and its impact on
youth and sets forth a means by which courts and policymakers
should respond to these factual developments. The underlying
causes of such criminalization and the reasons for the disparities
among jurisdictions are beyond the scope of this article. Such
factors may include the availability of federal funding for school
resource officers, reduction of resources for classroom
management training, overcrowded classrooms, income levels,
racial demographics, and dismantling of desegregation decrees,
among many others. Future research in this area will be
important to ensure that youth benefit from the model of school
discipline as educational tool idealized by the Court.

